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Chapter 30 — Bruce Mutsvairo 
 
In search of political reform: How social media is contributing to 





In today’s globalised world, the growth of digital media is bringing about 
fundamental changes in the way people in sub-Saharan Africa think and act 
(Mutsvairo 2016). The availability of online movements provides a firsthand 
opportunity to critically examine current digital engagements among citizens and 
activists seeking political reform in Zimbabwe. The chapter argues that while social 
media is leading to a great deal of virtual awareness, very little action is taken to end 
the plight of citizens, thereby weakening the real impact of social media activism. 
ICTs, and more specifically the digital media, have radically changed the way 
cultures, economies, governments, and human beings interact with each other. 
Similarly, the development of global information and communication infrastructures 
has radically transformed ways in which knowledge and content are created, 
produced, and distributed. Conceptualizing activism in an African context requires a 
cross-disciplinary examination of factors facilitating and inhibiting its growth across 
the continent. This chapter therefore attempts to look at opportunities and 
challenges facing online protests in the wake of growing social media prevalence in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
It is being assumed that with protests movements such as the Arab Spring, Occupy 
Movement, #BlackLives Matter and #BringBackOurgirls taking centre stage, social 
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media is playing an instrumental role in driving the popularity of socio-political 
movements throughout the world. Online civic campaigns are also gathering 
momentum in Zimbabwe with netizens using social media platform to demand 
political change. For example, social media outrage was prompting civil society 
organizations and opposition parties to turn out in huge numbers countrywide 
during the 2016 anti-government demonstrations and rallies, which they hoped 
would force former President Robert Mugabe’s government to resign, giving many a 
renewed hope for political change.  
 
This chapter uses data collected from face-to face discussions with members of the 
Zimbabwean communities in the North East of the UK to determine ways through 
which digital participation among expatriate Zimbabweans is contributing to both 
online and offline activism in the Southern African nation. Focus group discussions 
with 10 participants were bolstered by further in-depth interviews with 15 other 
Zimbabweans, along with a case study analysis of current digital protest movements 
in the country, which are gaining ground on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. All 
interviews were conducted between January and April 2016. To this end, the study 
investigates how local Zimbabwean activists utilize digital and social media, 
identifying tactical similarities and differences to the use of these platforms in other 
regions of the world.  
 
The chapter also explores the apparent advantages and disadvantages of using such 
platforms. Indeed, the suggestion by Dalton (2007:143) that a Chinese student at the 
1989 Tiananmen Square democracy rally held a poster that read, ‘I don’t know what 
democracy means, but I know we need more of it’, potentially provides a powerful 
picture of the extent to which the notion of democracy is perceived and 
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comprehended across the world, including in Africa. For that reason, findings from 
this chapter will seek to demonstrate the real potential of cyberactivism insofar as 
strengthening or weakening increased online and offline democratic participation of 
Zimbabwean citizens is concerned. The chapter further questions whether online 
protests are indeed ‘liberation technologies’ as suggested by Diamond (2010: 70) and 
if so, to whatthe extent to which they are. The main research question for this 
chapter is: To what extent is social media aiding and strengthening citizen 
participation in politics in Zimbabwe? 
 
As political leaders in Africa, including longtime Kenyan opposition leader Raila 
Odinga, utilize digital technologies to communicate, reach out and debate their 
political agendas with citizens, the role played by platforms such as Twitter and 
Facebook cannot be underestimated, given social media’s ability to virtually 
mediatize information and connect people. Content sharing and online debating is 
making citizens active participants in political decisions that affect them. This has led 
to the inevitable introduction of ‘electronic democracy’ on the world scene 
(Tsagaraousianou et al 1998). These scholars claim electronic democracy best 
describes the intermediary role of digital technologies in augmenting citizen 
participation in the political stratum. The flourishing usage of the internet has, for 
example, helped a string of blogs and websites establish themselves as leading 
providers of Zimbabwe-focussed digital news, drawing readers from the country’s 
diaspora communities both in the West, Africa and beyond. 
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The open space provided by social media platforms is not only allowing some 
Zimbabweans to freely comment and critique news from an array of sources, but 
citizens are now sharing content with family and friends, helping spread news and 
information about events and issues that affect them. The possibility to provide 
comments to each published article has led to the creation of a new form of 
interaction as readers share comments and opinions with each other. These people 
have become the ‘new journalists’ of the modern day, gathering news and 
distributing them on social media forums. Those living in Zimbabwe are also able to 
access these platforms: a development which has challenged state media’s 
monopolization of news. For example, the 2015 disappearance of human rights 
activist Itai Dzamara, allegedly at the hands of state agents, has confirmed social 
media’s status as a venue for dissent, activism, and political campaigning, as citizens 
turn to Facebook and other social networks to criticise the government for allegedly 
engineering the activist’s abduction. Government denials of involvement in 
Dzamara’s disappearance have been met by revolts on social media, particularly on 
Facebook and WhatsApp. With the country’s 92-year-ol Edx- president Mugabe had 
declareding his interest of in runningextending his 37-year reign during the 2018 
electionsbefore a military coup ousted his government in November 2017. While 
Mugabe, now 94, made sure , in a country where media laws prohibiting “insults” 
toing histhe presidency stayed intact,t, activists turned to social media networks and 
the Zimbabwean blogosphere, which they  have been flooded with debates on 
political reform, rising polarities and increasing interest in human rights activism. 
 
While not every Zimbabwean citizen has access to the internet or social media in 
particular, online debates dominating the cyber-space point to a paradigm shift in 
terms of the gathering and sharing of new media content. Zimbabweans living in the 
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North East of the UK and elsewhere across the world have used their own access to 
social media and other digital platforms to spearhead campaigns that potentially 
have helped shape events at home, even though evidence on the ground still shows 
that their long-serving president is not giving up. But recent online protests are 
taking a cue from recent developments in the Middle East and elsewhere across the 
world where citizens have taken to new technologies to demand political reform. 
Uprisings in Tunisia (Lotan et al 2011), Egypt (Tufekci & Wilson 2012) and China 
(Yang 2012) were spearheaded and coordinated on various social media platforms.  
 
In ZimbabweAhead of Mugabe’s resignation, previously-unknown clergyman Evan 
Mawarire hads managed to harness social media for political engagement by using 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube in search of government accountability. He has 
becaome a household name among Zimbabweans, who followed his message to take 
the country’s flag everywhere they go, demanding government accountability. The 
viral sharing of Mawarire’s videos on social media platforms wais by no doubt 
rapidly stimulating online political activity and community activism. What madekes 
Mawarire stand out though wais his ability to engage officials both online and 
offline. When the country’s reserve bank chief announced plans to introduce ‘bond 
notes’ to ease out the pending financial constraints, Mawarire used social media 
networks to oppose the move. Even better, he organized a meeting with the 
governor, with anti-government activists in attendance, to demonstrate his group’s 
opposition to the idea.  Whether the government will listen or not, it is clearThere is 
still no evidence as to what role social media played towards Mugabe’s departure 
but signs of  Mawarire’s ability to is turning online interactions into offline realities 
made the clergyman and his supporters believe the online platform was giving them 
a unique voice. 
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: one thing that often has been a problem in countries where these online activist 
campaigns have been waged, including China and Iran. 
 
Interestingly, protest music is emerging as a dominant form of civil and mass 
political participation movement in Zimbabwe. Thanks to a long and sustained 
relationship with political reform in Africa, the movement is using social media 
platforms to reinvigorate political songs as strategic tools for political and human 
rights activism. Zimbabwe’s best-known musician, Thomas Mapfumo, has played a 
leading role through his music in the promotion of human rights, freedom and 
transparency, both in pre- and post-independence Zimbabwe. Mapfumo, who 
tirelessly sang against colonialism in Africa, is shifting his attention tomaintained his 
celebrity status on social media by posting anti- President Mugabe clips on YouTube 
’s gaccusing the former president’s government of overnment, which he accuses of 
committing gross human rights violations, including its purported failure to 
guarantee citizens with freedom of assembly. 
 
Freedom of speech and assembly, and the right to dissent, have all long been 
sensitive topics both in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe cannot be 
put in the same league as North Korea when it comes to totalitarianism. While anti-
government journalists have in the past been targeted, the country’s laws guarantee 
freedom of speech and association. Civil liberties are nearly non-existent, even 
though again the law allows for such freedoms to be guaranteed to citizens. 
Newspapers critical of Mugabe including the Daily News, The Standard, The 
Independent and Newsday have traditionally beenare allowed to publish, even though 
it is perhaps fair to say many journalists and indeed social media users, as confirmed 
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by focus-group interviews with Zimbabweans living in the East of England, self-
censor for fear of reprisals. Mugabe has continuously argued he cannothad 
maintained no one could be lectureed him on human rights because he was the first 
to introduce democracyhas fought for universal suffrage leading to the country’s 




Focus group interviews with Zimbabweans living in the UK were used as a principal 
methodology in this chapter. As part of an Empathy & Trust In Communicating 
Online (EMoTICON)-sponsored research project on social media and democracy in 
Zimbabwe, in which I was the principal investigator, a very small sample size was 
originally used for this research. This was deliberate, as the intention was to pursue 
frank and deep-seated discussions in a face-to-face setting with individuals involved 
in online participation. In pursuance of this objective, participants were invited to a 
workshop at Northumbria University in March 2016, with one Zimbabwean 
currently studying at the university acting as a key go-between between the project 
and the Zimbabwean community. The workshop, which lasted for close to seven 
hours, included presentations from members of the research team, along with open 
discussions with the participants, who were asked to share their experiences and 
views regarding diasporic influences towards democracy in the country. A blogging 
workshop, involving learning and sharing blogging skills, also featured on the 
programme. Apart from the student, who facilitated the meeting along with another 
member of the Zimbabwean community in the region, none of my research team 
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Following the initial results from the workshop, 15 more interviews were conducted 
with Zimbabwean activists and journalists. Two of the 15 had participated in the 
workshop. These interviews were not only aimed at ascertaining the level of online 
participation that the interviewees were engaged in, but also examining whether 
they thought sharing information online was contributing to the enhancement of 
democracy in the country. The majority of those interviewed individually had 
originally wanted to participate in the workshop but had either pulled out or had 
shown preference to be interviewed individually. A trip to Zimbabwe in April 2016 
completed a series of interviews as part of this project. In Zimbabwe, eight 
journalists were asked to share their thoughts on increased online participation and 
practices among Zimbabweans. They were also asked to share their opinions on 
whether they thought citizen journalism was crippling or boosting their work. 
Furthermore, they also had to share their perspectives on social media and its 
potential to free societies such as Zimbabwe’s. Interviews were chosen as the 
primary methodology because I wanted to interact with the people who are using 
these technologies. Besides, interviews are widely used in qualitative research for 
various reasons (See Trochim 2000, O’Leary, 2004). In my case, I wanted to find out 
more about why people are engaging in online practices with the hope of making 
political changes, their worries, their predictions and their biases. I emphasized the 
participatory nature of data gathering, focusing on the people who participate in 
online deliberations in order to find out what they do and why they do it. The pilot 
study in Newcastle Upon Tyne also gave me an opportunity to mingle and socialise 
with members of the Zimbabwean diasporic community, all of whom confirmed 
their active use of social media to participate in social and political issues within 
their own communities and beyond. Data was processed and analysed inductively 
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in pursuit of what Marshall and Rossman (1999:154) describe as identifying ‘salient 
themes, recurring ideas or language, and patterns of belief.’ 
 
Findings and discussion  
 
Digital activism in Zimbabwe remains in an evolving stage even though it is 
precipitously spreading. Social media’s transformative ability to appeal to multiple 
audiences is driving new forms of social interaction, exchange, dialogue and online 
collaboration, unquestionably helping transform lives by giving hope to the 
politically marginalized. Zimbabwe, in spite of its political quagmires, has 6 million 
internet users, which is half of the population (POTRAZ 2016). While clearly not all 
of these internet users are digital activists, 10 of the 15 interviewees confirmed that 
they believed easy access was enabling the participation of citizens in online political 
engagements. Results further showed that even though the majority of Zimbabweans see the potential route 
towards political change in the country as a direct result of the mass use of social media, issues such as the use of 
law to cripple online dissent are still a major concern. ARecently a government minister under Mugabe’s regime 
stated in 2017 that the government was looking at legal ways to ensure that social media users would be 
‘responsible’ for what they say online. The introduction of such a law could have led to increased self-censorship, 
all ten participants in the workshop agreed. This did not stop Mugabe from appointing what perhaps was the 
world’s first cabinet minister in charge of “cyber security,” a ministry that was discontinued by his replacement, 
Emmerson Mnangagwa.The introduction of such a law could lead to increased self-censorship, all ten 
participants in the workshop agreed. 
 
It, however, must be noted that when it comes to the laws that govern the media, contemporary Zimbabwean 
media owes a lot to the pre-independence, White-led governments. If African natives did not have 
civil, political or social rights under colonial rule and the post-independence 
government has failed to meaningfully allow the flourishing of views opposed to the 
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state, then one can understand why the media has been at the center of state political control 
and manipulation of the masses both before and after independence in 1980. In the 
same vein, The Rhodesia Herald (renamed The Herald at independence), along with the 
Bulawayo-based Chronicle and their sister weeklies the Sunday Mail and the Sunday 
News, represented elitist White interests in Rhodesia. Repressive laws were used to 
protect these interests. Participants in the workshop tended to agree that the current 
government had used colonial era laws to punish dissent. In the same way (Mukasa 
2003) concludes: ‘The journalistic ethos of the times was to promote European 
cultural standards while denigrating African culture and political agitation as the 
nemesis of Western civilization and Christianity’. Participants agreed the current 
government had used state media to target and ridicule opponents. 
 
Several challenges stand in the way of social media activism. The generational gap is 
visibly one of them, results showed, as interviewees were able to highlight this as a 
major challenge facing digital activism in Zimbabwe. While youths around the 
country have been early adopters of social media, recognizing the profound 
opportunities that platforms such as Twitter and Facebook are offering, Mugabe’s 
generation does not understand social media. This may sound like an advantage to 
activists, but the problem is when it comes to engaging politicians online, very few 
are willing to take part because not all of them understand the dynamics of social 
media. Besides, there simply is no defined policy on how to react to social media 
insults. Aside from the generational issue, not everyone understands social media, 
young or old. Even when they do, they may not know how to use it for the purposes 
of activism. A comment by one of the interviewees sums up this dilemma: ‘I may know 
how to use social media but my grandmother in rural Chibi has never heard of it. I don’t know how to educate 
her about it and besides what is the point of doing that?’ Indeed, it may not be in the interest of an 80-year-old 
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struggling to feed herself to know how to use social media for the purposes of activism. What is come down to is 
the fact that it is a matter of priorities. Those starving will first seek food. Joining Facebook therefore becomes a 
luxury. 
 
Events in the past were forcing those interviewed in Newcastle to self-censor their 
participation online. Some said they had two Facebook accounts: a ‘real one and a 
fake one. When I use a fake account, I say whatever I want, when I use my real 
name, I have to censor what I write on Facebook’. It is widely reported that Mark 
Chavunduka and Ray Choto, senior journalists from the weekly Standard 
newspaper, were arrested and tortured by state security agents in 1999 following 
publication of a story in which they alleged — citing military sources — that some 
senior army officers had been detained in connection with a coup attempt on 
President Mugabe’s government. Chavunduka died in 2012 while Choto has since 
relocated to Washington DC, where he workedis currently employed atfor Voice of 
America. While incidents like this were forcing some to self-censor their content, all 
eight journalists interviewed in Zimbabwe confirmed that safety was not a major 
worry among them. Instead they were more critical of the government’s desire to 
curtail freedom of speech, especially on social media platforms. Apart from the 
skirmishes involving Chavunduka and Choto, as well as inestimable threats and 
possible arrests against some of his journalists, Trevor Ncube’s Standard and 
Independent weeklies, as well as the Newsday daily, have been publishing in the 
country for years, despite their fierce and formidable anti-Mugabe stance. Social 
media, journalists agreed, was making it difficult for government to target its critics 




Chapter 30 — Mutsvairo 
12 
AIPPA, or the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy law, which was 
introduced in 2002 and gave the Media minister authority to determine who could 
work as a journalist, was proving difficult to enforce because in the digital age: 
‘everyone can be a journalist’, a freelance journalist told me. Signed to become law 
by ex-President Mugabe on 22 May 2013, the new constitution, in unprecedented 
fashion, includes a bill of rights, which stipulates freedom of expression. In a 
departure from the past, artistic expression and academic freedom are also 
recognized in the new constitution. While participants in the initial workshop 
welcomed the new constitution, they still were scepticalskeptical about the 
government’s commitment to respecting freedom of expression. They pointed to the 
fact that the current situation had been better compared to the past when journalists 
were targeted dubiously through the use of AIPPA. In the year of its inception, at 
least seven journalists including the Guardian’s American-born correspondent 
Andrew Meldrum were arrested for violating the law’s provisions. Other victims of 
the law in 2002 included local journalists Dumisani Muleya, Chris Gande, Farai 
Mutsaka, Bornwell Chakaodza, Geoff Nyarota and Fungayi Kanyuchi. The 
availability of social media was making it difficult for government to target specific 
people. 
 
Again, to suggest social media platforms provide a potential to facilitate political 
and social changes, provides a falsely alarming assumption that despotic regimes are 
not seeking to regulate and restrain these supposedly liberating spaces. African 
governments, especially those with a history of stifling freedom of association and 
assembly, will certainly be watching who is saying what on Facebook, which 
without doubt has been widely adopted as a mobile communicative tool across 
Africa. For example, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s government forcefully 
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reacted against social media-coordinated political protests in April and October 
2011, banning protests, arresting organizers and blocking access to social networking 
sites. In Zimbabwe, an activist was arrested in the second city of Bulawayo in March 
2011, accused of attempting to use Facebook as a platform for dethroning President 
Mugabe’s government. The activist had posted a message on what was believed to 
be opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai’s Facebook wall, saying Zimbabweans 
should replicate the Arab Spring protests in Egypt. The legitimacy of social media-
led political activism has not just attracted debate in Africa. 
 
Yet Mugabe has never been the one to lightly take criticism. Criticizing Mugabe hads 
long been a taboo. However, in the social media age, protesters attack the president 
willy-nilly. While he still retains power, the opportunity to pass a negative comment 
against the feared leader is something many illustriously accept as a positive shift in 
circumstances. For this reason, many consider social media as a democratizing 
space, given its ability to give them an opportunity to anonymously voice their 
concerns against Mugabe and his government. From sharing social media memes of 
his dramatic fall at the airport in 2015, to peacefully confronting his government on 
the streets, Mugabe is became coming a subject of constant ridicule; his stranglehold 
on power appearing bes  to waning in the wake of spirited protests, most of which 
are coordinated online.  
 
It seems as if the most difficult challenge facing social media’s potential to transform 
societies like Zimbabwe politically is the issue of coordinating people online. With 
people freely saying what they want as they wish, it is difficult to tell people what to 
do, because in many instances you are dealing with people you do not know. As 
noted by one interviewee: ‘there is indeed democracy online. People say what they 
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want but I don’t think Mugabe cares what is being said online because the people 
who vote him into power are not even online’. Remarkably, this comment 
demonstrates the fundamental problems associated with using social media for 
political purposes. What the interviewee was alluding to is the fact that most of the 
ruling party’s supporters live in rural areas where they hardly access social media; 
and if they do, having access to the internet is not their main priority as they are 
faced with various other challenges. These are the people that Mugabe and his party 
wereare concerned with. They do not have, in most cases, digital literacy skills. Their 
main priority is to get food on the table instead of ‘liking’ or signing an online 
petition. 
 
‘With mobile phone penetration in Zimbabwe almost hundred percent, there is great 
scope for successful citizenship journalism initiatives’, a veteran journalist said. 
‘More and more Zimbabweans are seeking cheap alternative sources of news and 
mobile phones, through social media platforms, have become instant hits. Citizen 
journalists have grabbed the momentum and find it easy to circulate news on social 
media’ This view is shared by several journalists who were adamant that citizen 
journalists are not a threat to their profession. They see the diversity of news sources 
and platforms as a healthy sign of a democracy. Still, it is very easy to underestimate 
the importance of internet literacy when assessing the real impact that technology, 
and particularly citizen journalism, could have in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in 
Africa. Many people use the internet for a purpose that they are familiar with. Not 
everyone is aware of the internet’s multi-purpose functions. Moreover, not everyone 
with access to the internet understands what it is, or is keen to invest in trying to 
find out — something that confirms why the digital divide is still a real threat to 
progress. Worse still, in the case of Zimbabwe, unless you access the internet using 
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free wireless networks, the costs involved are so high: meaning unless you are an 
activist, accessing the internet for political purposes does not become your 




While it certainly would be wrong to underestimate the kind of potential that social 
media could have in enhancing democracy in Zimbabwe, it is quite clear more 
ground needs to be covered in terms of accessibility and education. It may seem easy 
for those living in the Diaspora to see the remarkable potential that social media 
carries, but the reality on the ground begs to differ. There is widespread hunger in 
the country and many people are surviving on selling fruit or vegetables, which 
means that unless the quality of life among Zimbabweans changes, it is very difficult 
to conclude that social media will bring more democracy to the country, since access 
to it is a mere luxury. Opportunistic social media campaigns, such as Mawarire’s, do 
not always lead to real reform.  
 
The sizeable number of people following Mawarire on Twitter does not point to any 
success in transforming his online initiative into a radical street movement. 
However, other copycat protest groups such as #Tajamuka or ‘We have said No’ 
have risen in the aftermath of Mawarire’s campaign bearing the brunt on state’s 
resolve to crackdown on protesters. Protest musicians are also providing an 
alternative medium of critique to the regime, but interviewees believed musicians 
such as Mapfumo would have a real impact if they were criticizing Mugabe from 
within the country, because not everyone of their supporter in active on social 
media. Hashtag activism, they argued, was new to Africa and carried with it a form 
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of elitism, which citizens from low income areas were not keen to quickly identify 
themselves with. Besides, they were adamant, the number of followers online or 
their determination to seek change should not measure the level of success for these 
groups, which means that their ability to force change or to influence Mugabe to 
rethink his policies would be seen as a major victory because the authoritarian rarely 
accepts defeat. The low level of activism attributed to self-censorship by the 
interviewees also stands in the way of the successes of online engagements. Even 
those living in England are still very careful about the language they use in 
criticizing Mugabe for fear of unknown consequences. Thus while it’s true to say 
social media is impacting the lives of Zimbabwean, it will take more time for it to 
actually have meaningful contribution towards political and social change given the 
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